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Abstract:  
  
The article analyzes the impact of the demographic factor on the prospects for the 
development of the world economy. 
  
The basis of the methodology is an analysis of the dynamics of macro indicators of the 
world's 10 leading economies, whose contribution exceeds 61% of world GDP. In the article 
the dynamics of macroeconomic and demographic indicators were analyzed, and their 
interrelation was established. 
 
The study analyzes the dynamics of the world economy. In the course of the study, it was 
shown that globalization brings not only advantages, but notable threats. The economic 
growth within the last 21 years led to the accumulation of colossal debts, which in future will 
become a limitation of the development of the world economy.   
 
The article shows that attempts to overcome demographic problems in the last decades did 
not have any success, and consequently, in the future it will be a barrier to the sustainable 
development of the world economy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The beginning of the 1990s was marked by the collapse of the USSR, and, in 
general, the socialist model of economic development. Modern communist 
China or Vietnam in economic terms are slightly different from any capitalist 
country in the Western world. From 1945 until the late 1980s there was a 
bipolar model of the world, which was fully relayed to the economy. In fact, 
there were two alternative models of economic development, two closed 
economies. 
 
The collapse of the USSR led to a change in world architecture and the 
formation of a unipolar world model and a single global economy. Actually, 
it was precisely from the 1990s that the concept of "globalization" entered the 
economic life, which is connected with the transnationalization of business; 
changing the world division of labor, increasing the mobility of the labor 
market and capital; standardization of national legislation and the fusion of 
different cultures. 
 
By the beginning of the 2000s, in fact, a single world economy had been 
formed. One of the main advantages of globalization (for which its supporters 
advocate) is economic growth. Usually, the indicator of the gross domestic 
product (hereinafter GDP) is used to describe the dynamics of economic 
growth. For intercountry comparison, the GDP indicator calculated at 
purchasing power parity (hereinafter referred to as PPP) is the most obvious 
(Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Dynamics of GDP for PPP for the period 1995-2016 (IMF Data, 2017). 
Country SubjectDescriptor Units 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2016 
Growth 
rate 
2016/199
5 
Brazil GDP for PPP 
USA 
Dollars 
Billions 
1306.756 1579.824 2046.98 2803.368 3216.167 3141.335 240.4% 
China GDP for PPP 
USA 
Dollars 
Billions 
2254.642 3698.622 6617.286 12405.881 19695.741 21291.766 944.4% 
France GDP for PPP 
USA 
Dollars 
Billions 
1337.635 1678.332 2046.601 2340.155 2665.863 2733.678 204.4% 
Germany GDP for PPP 
USA 
Dollars 
Billions 
2033.711 2430.427 2804.578 3279.529 3860.114 3980.282 195.7% 
India GDP for PPP 
USA 
Dollars 
Billions 
1426.298 2077.843 3238.203 5312.261 8003.405 8662.35 607.3% 
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Indonesia GDP for PPP 
USA 
Dollars 
Billions 
849.679 958.481 1356.414 2003.959 2849.796 3032.092 356.9% 
Japan GDP for PPP 
USA 
Dollars 
Billions 
2965.536 3405.45 4056.757 4485.871 5118.682 5237.79 176.6% 
Russia GDP for PPP 
USA 
Dollars 
Billions 
1389.47 1635.277 2474.758 3240.905 3759.692 3799.696 273.5% 
Great 
Britain 
GDP for PPP 
USA 
Dollars 
Billions 
1224.054 1556.051 2008.467 2251.123 2700.627 2785.563 227.6% 
USA GDP for PPP 
USA 
Dollars 
Billions 
7664.05 10284.75 13093.7 14964.4 18036.65 18569.1 242.3% 
 
The world economy consists of almost 200 countries, however, the top 10 
economies as of 1995 accounted for 58.9% of global GDP. By 2016, this share had 
risen to 61.1% (Figure 1). In fact, this means that the main benefits of globalization 
are gained by the rich countries. 
 
Figure. 1. The share of the first 10 economies in world GDP by PPP (Sutyagin et 
al., 2017). 
 
 
 
However, together with positive moments, globalization has also brought tangible 
losses. In particular, local, country crises began to "spread" to neighboring countries, 
having a regional or even global effect. 
 
A classic example is the "Asian financial crisis", which was originally formed in the 
bowels of the Thai economy (once one of the four "Asian tigers"). In May-June 
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1997, it resulted in a sharp devaluation of the Thai baht and the collapse of the Thai 
stock market. However, within a month or two the crisis spread to Malaysia, 
Indonesia and South Korea. Eventually, by 1998, the crisis affected most of the 
countries of Southeast Asia (including Japan, Hong Kong, Laos, the Philippines, 
China, India and Vietnam). Moreover, the crisis led to a massive outflow of capital 
from emerging markets, which ultimately contributed to Russia's default in 1998, 
and then Argentina's default in 2001. 
 
The situation with the "World Financial Crisis", which "matured" in the bowels of 
the US mortgage market during 2008-2009, touched the whole world. It is also 
remarkable that, starting from 2008-2009, the world economy still cannot "grope" 
for sustainable rates of development. There are many reasons for this, but within the 
framework of this article, we would like to focus on the demographic aspect of this 
problem. 
 
2. Methods 
 
The general theoretical basis of the study was a dialectical method, as well as the 
methods of analysis and induction. In addition to general scientific methods, 
statistical methods such as the dynamic analysis method (trend analysis), sampling 
methods, grouping method, extrapolation and interpolation methods, and others were 
widely used in the study. For the purposes of this study, we analyzed the dynamics 
of the macro indicators of these 10 leading countries for the period 1995-2016, 
including: 
 
• Macroeconomic indicators (Gross Domestic Product (nominal and purchasing  
   power parity, public debt (nominal amount); 
• Demographic indicators (number of working population, average age of the  
   population). 
 
In addition, in the process of research, the authors also calculated the labor 
productivity index. The labor productivity index (LP) is calculated as: 
 
GDPLP
P
=
                                                                                                         (1)
 
where: GDP - gross domestic product; P - number of employees. 
 
The choice of time horizon analysis is determined by the need for comparability of 
numerical series of macro-indicators of different countries, which was a separate 
problem. The fact is that the data of individual countries, mainly Indonesia, India, 
Brazil, data earlier than 1995 are not available in public sources. In some cases, 
there was no data (selectively by years or earlier than a certain year) until the year 
2000. To bring the numerical series of analyzed indicators into a comparable form, 
the data for missing periods were filled with extrapolation and interpolation methods 
based on trend analysis (Prytkova, 2017; Vasin et al., 2017). 
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Another important aspect is important, which implicitly leaves an imprint on the 
choice of the time horizon for analysis, namely, by 1995-1996 it became obvious 
that there started a formation of a unipolar world, and as a consequence, a single 
world economy centered in the United States. Information basis of this study was the 
data of: 
 
• The International Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org) (for macroeconomic and  
   demographic indicators); 
• Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations  
   (http://www.un.org/) (for retrospective and forecast data on the average age of the  
   population). 
 
3. Results 
 
The basis of the analysis is macro statistics of 10 leading countries in the world. The 
basic parameter of development is the GDP indicator. Table 1 (in the introduction) 
shows the dynamics of GDP by PPP (and the growth rate estimate) for the period 
1995-2016. In Table 2 similar estimates of nominal GDP are given. For intercountry 
analysis, we used the estimation approach of the GDP for PPP. However, in some 
cases, to calculate the relative indicators, we considered the nominal GDP estimates 
(for example, the level of public debt to GDP). 
 
Table 2. Dynamics of nominal GDP for the period 1995-2016. (IMF Data, 2017) 
Country 
SubjectDescripto
r 
Units 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2016 
Growt
h 
rate, % 
Brazil 
Gross domestic 
product, current 
prices 
Nationalcurrenc
y, billions 
720,985 1199,093 2170,584 3885,847 6000,572 6266,895 869% 
China 
Gross domestic 
product, current 
prices 
Nationalcurrenc
y, billions 
6153,905 
10057,68
3 
18919,03
9 
41070,82
6 
69910,944 74539,62 1211% 
France 
Gross domestic 
product, current 
prices 
Nationalcurrenc
y, billions 
1224,967 1485,303 1771,978 1998,481 2181,064 2225,92 182% 
Germany 
Gross domestic 
product, current 
prices 
Nationalcurrenc
y, billions 
1898,88 2116,48 2300,86 2580,06 3032,82 3132,67 165% 
India 
Gross domestic 
product, current 
prices 
Nationalcurrenc
y, billions 
12267,24
9 
21774,12
7 
36933,68
8 
77841,2 136753,3 
151904,81
4 
1238% 
Indonesia 
Gross domestic 
product, current 
prices 
Nationalcurrenc
y, billions 
549170,8 
1511556,
6 
3017393,
8 
6864133,
1 
11531716,
9 
12406809,
8 
2259% 
Japan 
Gross domestic 
product, current 
prices 
Nationalcurrenc
y, billions 
512541,8 526706 524132,9 500354 530465,7 537289,4 105% 
Russia 
Gross domestic 
product, current 
prices 
Nationalcurrenc
y, billions 
1535 7849,4 23218,8 49756,7 83232,6 85880,6 5595% 
UnitedKingdo
m 
Gross domestic 
product, current 
Nationalcurrenc
y, billions 
836,646 1080,863 1379,457 1572,439 1872,714 1939,637 232% 
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prices 
UnitedStates 
Gross domestic 
product, current 
prices 
Nationalcurrenc
y, billions 
7664,05 10284,75 13093,7 14964,4 18036,65 18569,1 242% 
 
Globalization brought not only economic growth, but strangely enough, it provoked 
a rapid growth of public debts. Table 3 shows the dynamics of the size of the public 
debt of the world's 10 leading economies (and growth rate). 
 
Table 3. The dynamics of the size of the public debt for the period 1995-2016. (IMF 
Data, 2017) 
Country SubjectDescriptor Units 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2016 
Growt
h 
rate, 
% 
Brazil 
Generalgovernmentgross
debt 
Nationalcurren
cy, billions 
357,60856 786,135 1488,699 2449,83 4351,321 4908,003 
1372
% 
China 
Generalgovernmentgross
debt 
Nationalcurren
cy, billions 
1319,843 2294,05 4937,582 
13858,25
4 
29786,55
1 
34460,525 
2611
% 
France 
Generalgovernmentgross
debt 
Nationalcurren
cy, billions 
683,6 870,4 1189,8 1631,7 2097,4 2151,308 315% 
German
y 
Generalgovernmentgross
debt 
Nationalcurren
cy, billions 
1038,995 1245,785 1541,352 2088,726 2157,88 2119,175 204% 
India 
Generalgovernmentgross
debt 
Nationalcurren
cy, billions 
8544,61 
16036,42
6 
29877,018 
52509,83
2 
95113,91
9 
105629,61
6 
1236
% 
Indonesi
a 
Generalgovernmentgross
debt 
Nationalcurren
cy, billions 
169144,60
64 
1321664,
26 
1285763,6
15 
1683400 3098640 
3455448,9
65 
2043
% 
Japan 
Generalgovernmentgross
debt 
Nationalcurren
cy, billions 
471118,9 732167,7 968916,5 
1080282,
2 
1262336,
9 
1285111,1
2 
273% 
Russia 
Generalgovernmentgross
debt 
Nationalcurren
cy, billions 
577,589 4373,08 3438,5 5254,2 
13270,51
6 
14629,958 
2533
% 
United 
Kingdo
m 
Generalgovernmentgross
debt 
Nationalcurren
cy, billions 
371,852 403,133 552,591 1194,338 1665,974 1729,281 465% 
United 
States 
Generalgovernmentgross
debt 
Nationalcurren
cy, billions 
4990 5660 8555,659 
14314,01
9 
19048,02
5 
19934,076 399% 
 
The issues of correlating of the economic growth of GDP and the growth of the debt 
burden will be discussed in more detail in the next section of the "Discussion". Such 
a rapid increase in the amount of debts raises a problem for the economies of the 
leading countries, and therefore the world economy as a whole, and in the future, 
threatens with potential defaults. The traditional approach to debt management 
suggests that the economy (GDP) should grow faster than the debt will grow. 
Otherwise, in the long term (at a constant rate), debt servicing will be more and 
more complicated. This means that more resources will be spent on debt servicing, 
which will further restrain economic growth. 
 
In this sense, the economy needs to influence the market in terms of economic 
growth: in practice, this will manifest itself in a sharp increase in GDP growth rates. 
In this case, the growth itself can be both extensive and intense. An intensive 
scenario of development is provided by means of outstripping increase in labor 
productivity. Labor productivity can be calculated by means of Formula 1. Below 
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we give information on the dynamics of the number of the employed in the economy 
(Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Dynamics of the number of employees for the period 1995-2016. (IMF 
Data, 2017) 
      1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2016 
Brazil Employment 
Persons, 
millions 75,739 78,488 86,500 93,100 92,800 90,300 
China Employment 
Persons, 
millions 681 721 746 761 775 776 
France Employment 
Persons, 
millions 22,812 22,768 23,831 24,503 24,976 25,092 
Germany Employment 
Persons, 
millions 35,762 36,065 35,683 37,72 40,073 41,212 
India Employment 
Persons, 
millions 313,90 365,40 408,20 400,00 431,76 433,39 
Indonesia Employment 
Persons, 
millions 83,5 89,8 93,9 108,2 121 121 
Japan Employment 
Persons, 
millions 64,573 64,458 63,566 62,984 64,016 64,645 
Russia Employment 
Persons, 
millions 66,2 64,8 68,3 69,9 72,3 72,8 
UnitedKingdom Employment 
Persons, 
millions 25,819 27,484 28,85 29,229 31,297 31,741 
UnitedStates Employment 
Persons, 
millions 124,908 136,901 141,71 139,077 148,841 151,437 
 
Next, let’s calculate the indicator of labor productivity (Table 5). Note that in the 
calculations we took into account the estimates of GDP for PPP. Also, note that the 
growth rate of labor productivity is lower than the GDP growth rate for PPPs (lower 
than the growth rate of nominal GDP). 
 
Table 5. Dynamics of labor productivity for the period 1995-2016. 
      1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2016 
Growth 
rate, % 
Brazil Laborproductivity ths. $ per person 17,253 20,128 23,665 30,111 34,657 34,788 202% 
China Laborproductivity ths. $ perperson 3,311 5,130 8,870 16,302 25,414 27,438 829% 
France Laborproductivity ths. $ perperson 58,637 73,715 85,880 95,505 106,737 108,946 186% 
Germany Laborproductivity ths. $ perperson 56,868 67,390 78,597 86,944 96,327 96,581 170% 
India Laborproductivity ths. $ perperson 4,544 5,686 7,933 13,281 18,537 19,987 440% 
Indonesia Laborproductivity ths. $ perperson 10,176 10,674 14,445 18,521 23,552 25,059 246% 
Japan Laborproductivity ths. $ perperson 45,925 52,832 63,820 71,222 79,959 81,024 176% 
Russia Laborproductivity ths. $ perperson 20,989 25,236 36,213 46,343 51,984 52,194 249% 
UnitedKingdom Laborproductivity ths. $ perperson 47,409 56,617 69,618 77,017 86,290 87,759 185% 
UnitedStates Laborproductivity ths. $ perperson 61,358 75,125 92,398 107,598 121,181 122,619 200% 
 
Conclusions about the growth of labor productivity of the leading economies of the 
world can be relayed to the whole world economy. The substantive side of the issue 
will be disclosed in the "Discussions" section. An extensive version of economic 
development requires more and more involvement of resources. In practice, such a 
scenario of growth will be manifested in an increase in the number of people 
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employed in the economy and in the utilization of production capacities. In this 
sense, the demographic situation in all analyzed countries becomes crucial. In detail, 
demographic issues and conclusions will be discussed in the "Discussions" section. 
 
4. Discussions 
 
In general, for the analyzed 21-year period the world economy has shown good 
results as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Average growth rate of GDP for PPP for the period 1995-2016. 
 
 
Of course, someone managed to pass this period better, someone worse. But 
speaking in general, these decades are the time of developing countries despite a 
number of regional crises and despite the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. 
However, what is noteworthy, the huge debt burden of almost all leading countries 
has become a payoff for economic growth. Now we are talking, first of all, about 
public debts; however, this is only because the statistics in the field of public 
borrowing is open. 
 
We don’t consider the reasons for such a rapid growth of public debts. Let's make 
only a reference to our earlier publications (Sutyagin et al., 2017). Let us note that 
this process is natural within the framework of the paradigm of modern credit 
money. 
 
We note only that for the vast majority of countries, there is a clear relationship 
between economic growth and the public debt (in some cases, the growth rate of 
public debts is twice as high as GDP dynamics). The only exception, perhaps, on 
this list is Russia. The detailed analysis confirms rather than refutes the revealed 
tendency. Speaking of Russia, a sharp reduction in public debt occurred in a 
relatively short time interval between 2000-2010. This period was marked by a rapid 
increase in the world oil prices, due to currency proceeds from the sale, which 
managed to sharply reduce the national debt from $ 158.7 billion in 2000 to $ 37.6 
billion in 2010. The rest of the time interval is characterized by a previously 
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revealed trend: economic growth is accompanied by an increase in public debt. 
Should we assume that economic growth is accompanied by an increase in liabilities 
only in the public sector? Probably, not. However, statistics on the dynamics of 
corporate debt and the household sector of all countries is not so open. But we can 
operate with specific examples: in particular, the US macroeconomic statistics show 
that household debts in the 1990s-2010 rapidly increased. By the end of the first 
quarter of 2017, the size of household debt in absolute terms reached 12.730 billion. 
(Note that the size of the US federal debt at the end of 2016 was $ 19934.076 billion 
(IMF Data, 2017), not counting state debts) (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Dynamics of the debt of US households (percentage of GDP)  
(Shagardin, 2013) 
 
 
 
A similar situation is observed in the corporate sphere. In general, at the end of the 
first quarter of 2015, the Federal Reserve reported that the total debt of the United 
States reached 64.1 trillion. (Finam,, 2016), which is almost 3.5 times the US GDP 
(345% of GDP). Credible andverifiable estimatesconcerning the world debt, are 
difficult to obtain. Expert estimates are quite different. However, we can show the 
assessment of the Institute of International Finance. By early 2017, the global debt 
had reached 217 trillion (327% of the world GDP) (Figure 4). For 15 years, the ratio 
of the total debt to GDP has increased from 246% to 327% (almost 1.5 times), which 
once again emphasizes that the economic growth in the modern paradigm is based 
on credit incentives (and is accompanied by an increase in the debt burden) .At the 
same time, debt financing of the economic growth is a time bomb. Indeed, if the 
debt grows faster than the economy, this means that in the future it will be necessary 
to spend more and more money on debt servicing. The alternative is default. The 
easing of the situation may be the reduction of interest rates on debt servicing, in 
part, therefore, leading central banks, since 2008, have reduced interest rates. 
However, now they are close to zero, which led to the exhaustion of the debt 
management mechanism. 
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Figure 4. Dynamics of total world debt for the period of the first quarter of 2002- 
the first quarter of 2017 (RBC, 2017). 
 
 
As an alternative, we can suggest a sharp increase in the rate of the economic 
growth. We emphasize that this in itself is doubtful, and we are only talking about 
the mathematical probability of such a growth. Now we do not understand the 
methods of such stimulation (we note once again that in recent years it has been 
solved by means of credit pumping). We should say that the growth itself is still 
questionable, since it requires a steady demand. If there was such a demand, this 
would be confirmed by the dynamics of prices for energy resources, which, 
unfortunately, is not observed and is not expected in the foreseeable future. 
 
In itself, the economic growth can occur in an extensive or intensive scenario. 
Intensive growth in theory is accompanied by a faster dynamics of labor 
productivity. In practice, it should be an industrial revolution. However, attention is 
paid to tables 1 and 5: for the period 1995-2016 the economies of all 10 countries 
grew faster than the labor productivity (Figure 5). 
 
In principle, there is nothing new here, and this phenomenon is well described by the 
law of diminishing marginal productivity. The law itself is stable in the short term, 
when the technological level is unchanged. We do not want to draw conclusions 
regarding the prospects for changes in labor productivity in the future. It is important 
only that now the scenario of intensive growth has no visual confirmation despite all 
the technical innovations that the world saw in the 1990-2000s. 
 
The extensive growth must be accompanied by an increasing involvement of labor 
and capital. All this is possible only with a favorable demographic situation. In other 
words, an extensive development path is possible in case of the demographic 
growth. 
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Figure 5. Comparison of growth rates of labor productivity and GDP for PPP for 
the period 1995-2016. 
 
 
On the contrary, a negative demographic situation is a big threat to the economy. 
The "working hands" are really needed for a growing economy. The negative 
demographic situation, first of all, manifests itself in the form of an aging 
population. The latter leads to an increase in the burden on the pension system (in 
fact, the number and proportion of pensioners is growing). The pension system of a 
lifetime working through mandatory or voluntary payments accumulates funds that, 
for the purpose of increasing them, are invested by pension funds. As a rule, pension 
funds implement a conservative investment policy: the basis of investment is 
government bonds.  
 
However, in many developed countries (USA, Japan, EU countries), the level of 
interest rates is close to zero (or, at least, comparable with the rate of inflation), 
which prevents pension funds from implementing an effective investment policy (to 
increase pension accumulation). We should note that the situation in developing 
countries (Russia, China, Indonesia, India) is not much better: a higher level of rates 
is compensated by a higher level of inflation. All this leads to huge deficits in the 
pension systems of different countries, which are most often solved through 
transfers from state budgets, which, in a spiral, further increases the burden on 
public finances. 
 
And this shows how important a positive demographic situation is for sustainable 
economic growth. However, many countries have already faced a demographic 
crisis. From 1995 to 2015 even in prosperous China, the United States, India, Brazil, 
the proportion of the working population hasn’t risen. The situation is worsein 
Europe (including Russia) and Japan. The situation becomesmore clear if we 
analyze the dynamics of the average age of the population (monitored by the 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations). In all the 10 
countries, the population is noticeably aging (Table 6). In addition, according to the 
UN assessment, by 2050 the problem will have become even more critical (Table 6). 
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Table 6. The prognosis of the average age of the population and comparison with 
the retirement age (World Population Prospects, 2016; Your pension, 2017). 
Country Index Unit 
1995 2015 2050 
Reference: Retirementage 
Male Female 
China Median age years 27.0 37.0 45.0 60 50-55 
USA Median age years 30.7 38.0 41.1 65 65 
India Median age years 21.8 26.6 38.6 60 60 
Japan Median age years 39.6 46.5 54.9 65 65 
Germany Median age years 38.4 46.2 49.4 65-67 65-67 
Russia Median age years 35.0 38.7 45.3 60 55 
Brazil Median age years 23.8 31.3 40.4 65 60 
Indonesia Median age years 22.8 28.4 41.1 55 55 
UK Median age years 36.4 40.0 43.5 65 60 
France Median age years 36.4 41.2 44.7 60 60 
 
The increase in the average age of the population means an increase in the number of 
pensioners, and, consequently, creates an additional burden on the pension system 
and public finances. This situation can be called a trap "Debt - demography", when 
because of the deteriorating demographics low returns make the pension system 
bankrupt. 
 
Unfortunately, the demographic situation is likely to worsen in all countries. For 
example, at present the most favorable situation with population growth is observed 
in Indonesia. However, UN estimates show that by 2050-2055 growth will be 
replaced by a reduction (United Nations, 2004). For many European countries 
(including Russia) and Japan, the demographic problem in general becomes a matter 
of survival. And there are few ways out of this situation: increasing the birth rate and 
encouraging migration. Both methods have no simple solutions. 
 
The stimulation of childbirth has very limited potential, which is mainly due to the 
economic and cultural constraints, which are closely intertwined. It should be noted 
that a "big family" (a family with 3 or more children) has ceased to be an ideal for 
young people. Let's characterize the restrictions. 
 
Economic restrictions, as we called them, are associated with the deterioration of the 
economic situation and the complication of the processes of professional 
socialization of young people. For example, the research of Smith (2000) showed 
that inprosperous USA (note that the studies were conducted before the crisis of 
2008), the level of economic activity of women increased from 49% in 1970 to 
71.5% in 1995 , mainly as a result of increased economic activity of women with 
young children. The share of traditional families with a housewife in 1972 was 53% 
of officially registered families; by 1998, it had fallen to 21%. On the contrary, the 
share of families with two economically active spouses increased to 59% of married 
couples in 1995, compared to 32% in 1972. Moreover, the contribution of women to 
family income does not cease to grow. Since 1994, in 22.5% of families, the wife's 
income exceeds her husband's income (OECD, 2016). Undoubtedly, partially this is 
the result of cultural shifts. However, if in richfamilies the main reason is 
emancipation, in working familiesthe most important thing is an economic necessity. 
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In addition, education is getting more and more important, which forces young 
people to postpone the terms of marriage for the sake of education and career. 
Studies of T. Smith have shown that the percentage of adults who had never been 
married increased from 15 to 23% between 1972 and 1998. In addition, during the 
period 1960-1997 the average age of marriage increased from 22.8 to 26.8 years for 
men and from 20.3 to 25 years for women (OECD, 2016). 
 
Cultural restrictions are associated with the transformation of cultural values that 
have occurred over the past 25-35 years. Let us focus on a few cultural trends of 
these years: 
 
• Formation of self-centered ideology in the youth environment (provokes an  
  increase in the number of divorces); 
• The growth of the same-sex ties and the legalization of the same-sex marriages; 
• Development of the "child free" ideology. 
 
Each of the indicated trends does not seem to be significant. However, together they 
create a fairly strong cultural background, working against the cult of the "big 
family". For example, studies of the Economic Cooperation Organization showed 
that the overall divorce rate (per 1000 people) in different countries in 1970, 1995 
and 2014 was biased (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Total number of divorces per 1000 people (OECD, 2016) 
 
 
 
Note that the trend is quite evident (there are rare exceptions, especially if we 
compare the estimates of 1970 and 1995) and is valid for different countries with 
different religious traditions. We note that since the mid-1990s, the trend has slowed 
down significantly, but it's too early to speak about any turning point. We are going 
to show a map of the ratio of divorces to marriages (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. The percentage of divorces and marriages in 2014 (MAP, 2013) 
 
 
Note that high rates of divorces are typical for developed countries. And in just five 
European countries the share of divorces exceeds 60%. So we can conclude that it 
works against the cult of the "big family". 
 
The second notable cultural trend in recent decades is the growth in the number and 
share of the same-sex couples who, in many countries, have the rights of 
heterosexual couples. We are not going to give any moral assessment of this trend. 
Let's talk only about the figures: for example, in  mid-2016, there were 24 countries 
in the world where gay marriage was legalized, and 18 other countries where other 
forms of the same-sex unions (civil partnerships or civil unions) were registered  
(Figure 7). It is interesting how this map is correlated with the notion of a 
"developed" economy. 
 
The dynamics of the trend is clearly illustrated by the results of a 2006 study by G.J. 
Gates. The analysis showed that for the period from 2000 to 2005 the number of the 
same-sex couples in the US increased from 600 thousand pairs to 770 thousand 
pairs, or by 28.3% (Gates, 2006). Moreover, the research of Gates showed that in the 
USA in 2000-2005 in some states the number of the same-sex couples increased by 
1.5-2 times (Kolesnichenko et al., 2017) (Figure 8).  
 
Finally, we give another indicator - the proportion of homosexuals and bisexuals 
from the total number of adults (Figure 9). At the same time, G.J. Gates's research 
shows that the main contribution to this trend is made by the large cities of the 
United States. In itself, the growth in the number of the same-sex couples and the 
legalization of marriages, as it seems, has nothing to do with demography. In fact, 
everything is somewhat more complicated. Firstly, the same-sex couples do not have 
their own children - children in such families are adopted (so, they do not participate 
in population growth, but rather in its "redistribution"). Secondly, there are still no 
sociological studies on how the same-sex couples affect the future of their children. 
And, in principle, this topic is a taboo. 
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Figure 8. Ten states-leaders in increase in the number of same-sex couples for the 
period 2000-2005. (Gary J. Gates, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 9. Ten leading states with a share of homosexuals and bisexuals from the 
total number of adults (Gary J. Gates, 2006) 
 
 
 
One of the few studies of recent years of the American sociologist Sullins (2016) 
shows that children who have been brought up by the same-sex couples, at an older 
age (after 20 years), often have psychological problems. The research by Sullins 
shows that by the age of 28 the children brought up by same-sex parents face the 
risk of suffering from depression by 2.25 times. According to the scientist, 37% of 
adults who grew up in ordinary families and 72% brought up by the same-sex 
parents suffer from obesity. In addition, the sociological research of Sullins showed 
that 7% of those brought up in ordinary and 37% brought up in the same-sex 
families think of suicide from time to time (Sillins, 2016). Anyway, but we can 
hardly say that the growth of the same-sex couples is unlikely to contribute to the 
spread of large families. 
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The third cultural shift in recent years has been made by the development of the 
"childfree" ideology, the essence of which is the deliberate refusal from the birth of 
children by healthy families (families who physiologically can have children). As a 
rule, the main leitmotif of justifying the adherents of this ideology is that the child 
restricts personal freedom. 
 
Sociological surveys show that the share of adherents of "childfree" in Japan reaches 
30% of respondents; in Sweden, 29% (Kazachikhina, 2014). Similar polls in Russia 
in 2014 showed that 17 percent of Muscovites stated this position; in the whole 
country - 6 percent of citizens (Fedotova and Chepovskaya, 2015). It is quite 
obvious that these families (being healthy) fall out of the process of reproduction of 
labor resources. 
 
To sum up, all of the above factors work against the traditional views on the family. 
At the same time, such tendencies are typical not only for the United States, but also 
for all the countries of the Western world (and Japan). It resulted in a decrease in the 
birth rate (per woman). For example, in the US for the period of 1950 - 2015 it 
decreased from 3.09 to 1.84; in Japan from 3.65 to 1.4; in Germany from 2.1 to 1.5 
(Demoscope, 2017) (provided that for the population growth the coefficient should 
be more than 2). 
 
Realizing that the process of self-reproduction is objectively going too low, many 
countries of the West consciously encourage migration. However, the practice of the 
European Union shows that migration poses more problems rather than benefits; the 
growth of crime, ethnic conflicts, displacement of indigenous people, etc. At the 
same time, the basis for the influx is a low-skilled labor force, and there are not 
enough jobs. In addition, the experience of the EU as a whole, Germany in 
particular, shows that migrants do not seek to assimilate, live in their communities 
and do not seek to work (counting on unemployment benefits) (Shapilov, 2014). In 
Germany, for example, the social benefit is 400 euros, which is much more than the 
wages of most migrants in their homeland. 
 
In this regard, the "migration method" cannot solve the demographic problem, and 
the costs are quite real. According to the estimates of the Institute of World 
Economy (IWE), the money to be spent on migrants in Germany for the period 
2016-2022 is going to be 385 billion euros (Feliakhov, 2016). Undoubtedly, the 
current wave of European migration is largely a "force majeure", but it is provoked 
by certain geopolitical interests, including European countries, and migrants move 
not to the poorest EU countries, but mostly to Germany and France. At the same 
time, the problem of migration and socialization of migrants is topical not only in 
Europe, but also in the United States. 
 
Thus, migration as a way of solving demographic problems has a questionable 
effectiveness. In this connection, returning to the initial premise, the demographic 
problem is a kind of doom, that is, the problems of pension provision will increase in 
 V.Yu. Sutyagin, Y.Yu. Radyukova, E.A. Kolesnichenko, T.M. Kozhevnikova 
 
477  
the future, creating an additional burden on public finances and further on the 
economy as a whole. Another important fact is that the influence of demography on 
the economy is long-term and manifests itself with a large time lag. In addition, in 
most countries the steps made within the last decades to improve the demographic 
situation can hardly be considered successful. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Thus, the study of the financial engineering functionality in addition to the modeling 
of corporate strategies for attracting financial resources has allowed drawing the 
conclusion that the analytical support of financial engineering, as a process of 
selection and balancing financial tools attracted by the corporation, allows reducing 
the level of risks and costs on their hedging. Corporate structures should form for 
themselves the most optimal configuration of financing tools, depending on the scale 
of operation, financial stability, cost of financing tools servicing, belonging to the 
industry segmentation and the type of the used production technology. 
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